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Abstract 
This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from 
conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the 
use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under 
different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss 
model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. 
Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via 
loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-
generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either 
capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank’s size, earnings profile, or the 
structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained 
business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.  
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1. Introduction 
A well-established stream of literature has identified the use of loan loss provisions (LLP) 
by bank managers in capital and earnings management4. Their motivation is: to avoid 
regulatory capital adequacy charges that are incurred in falling below the minimum capital 
adequacy requirements; to increase earnings-based compensation; and to prevent debt covenant 
violations (see e.g. Moyer, 1990; Wahlen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007; 
Leventis et al., 2011). The discretionary use of capital and earnings management practices is 
an obvious focus for standard setters, but little emphasis has been given to study the 
comparative use of LLP to manage capital and earnings across Islamic and conventional banks. 
 Capital and earnings management can be achieved through the exercise of discretion in the 
magnitude or timing of the recognition of certain loan losses and in the levels reported for LLP 
(Ahmed et al., 1999). Where banks might deliberately engage in capital and earnings 
management practices via LLP, this may compromise the quality of financial reporting and 
generate excessive agency costs (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Beaver & Engle, 1996; 
Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
The primary motivation of this study is to compare capital and earnings management 
practices of conventional and Islamic banks located in the same countries but operating under 
different regulatory requirements. Our investigation informs regulators and investors as it 
responds to calls for research to establish the relevance of bank type on LLP decisions and the 
possible opportunistic behaviour of bank managers (Fonseca & Gonza´lez, 2008; Bushman & 
Williams, 2012; Elnahass et al., 2014; Belal et al., 2015; Abdelsalam et al., 2016).  
                                                          
4 In line with Healy & Wahlen (1999) and Ahmed et al. (1999), we define capital and earnings management as the use of 
management’s judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions where the objective is to manipulate regulatory 
capital adequacy ratios reported in line with Basel II requirement and/or overstate/understate reported earnings in order to 
mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes. 
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The profit-loss sharing business model of Islamic banks requires contractual arrangements 
between a bank and its investment account holders (IAHs), i.e., depositors. This tends to 
constrain Islamic banks’ ability to manage capital and earnings through LLP. Moreover, agency 
costs are relatively higher in Islamic banks, because IAHs are not directly involved in financial 
and business decisions (i.e., they have no representation on the board of directors) and so must 
monitor their investments through published financial information. This gives rise to the 
possibility of managerial opportunism (Abdel Karim & Archer, 2002; Safieddine, 2009). In 
attempting to protect their investments, the motivation of IAHs is to try to influence regulators 
to monitor and develop additional governance mechanisms in Islamic banks in order to raise 
the quality of financial reporting. 
 Unlike the single governance-layer in conventional banks (i.e., board of directors and audit 
committees), Islamic banks are subject to an extra governance mechanism of the Shariah 
supervisory boards5 (see Belal et al., 2015). Furthermore, the ethos of Islamic banking 
emphasizes ethical behavior and moral accountability, which would be expected to place limits 
upon managerial opportunism through the use of LLP. From those unique institutional bank 
characteristics and the constrained business model of Islamic banks, our premise is that capital 
and earnings management using LLP is less likely in Islamic banking than conventional 
banking. That premise is supported by the conventional banking literature which shows that a 
strong institutional environment may restrain the use of accounting discretion and aggressive 
earnings management (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015).  
With growing concerns over the discretionary use of LLP, added consideration is given to 
the structure of loan loss models. After the financial crisis of 2007, the “incurred” loan loss 
model (I-LLM), as defined by IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, 
                                                          
5 The Shariah supervisory board operates as an internal audit unit or internal control mechanism to certify that a bank’s 
operations are free from any element prohibited by the Islamic principles (Safieddine, 2009).  
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was perceived to have exacerbated the upheaval by the pro-cyclical6  lending that is associated 
with low levels of LLP (see Fillat & Montoriol-Garriga, 2010; Wezel et al., 2012). In response, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) proposed a change from the “incurred” 
to the “expected” loan loss model (E-LLM) under IFRS 9 Financial Instruments7.  
For conventional banks, the implementation of the E-LLM was deferred until 2018. 
However, for Islamic banks, LLP has matched the requirements of the E-LLM since at least 
2010 (see Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 2007; Taktak et al., 2010). For Islamic banks in Bahrain, Jordan, 
and Qatar, the E-LLM is now mandatory (see ACCA & KPMG, 2010; Sarea & Hanefah, 2013; 
AAOIFI, 2015). This offers an attractive setting to further examine capital and earnings 
management via the use of LLP as reported by Islamic and conventional banks that are located 
in the same countries but currently apply different regulatory frameworks (i.e., E-LLM versus 
I-LLM).  
For the period 2007-2013, we use panel data for Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, comprising 441 
bank-year observations (63 banks). Those three countries have a homogenous culture, similar 
macroeconomic features, and a dual banking system in which there is a relatively high 
concentration of Islamic banks (Ernst & Young, 2015b). Our findings indicate that during the 
whole sample period, banks tend to use LLP to manage Tier 1 capital ratio and to smooth 
earnings. However, the two bank types show significantly different capital and earnings 
management behavior. We find no evidence that Islamic banks manage capital or earnings 
through LLP. This is regardless of bank size and profitability position. For conventional banks, 
                                                          
6 Pro-cyclicality implies that banks expand their loan portfolio in a boom without raising their total capital. During a cyclical 
downturn, capital accumulation may be insufficient for LLP to cover credit losses. Banks are then forced to reduce lending, 
thereby intensifying pro-cyclical effects (see Jokipii & Milne, 2008). 
 
7 The I-LLM is a backward-looking model in that the creation of LLP is triggered by past events with no provision for the 
accumulation during booms of resources necessary to meet subsequent/sudden credit shocks. The E-LLM is a forward-looking 
model by which banks tend to build LLP in line with estimates of long-term expected loan losses; the aim is to reduce banks’ 
exposure to increased credit risk and sudden economic shocks experienced under the backward-looking model (see Ernst & Young, 
2014).  
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we find significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via LLP. This 
tendency is more obvious when reporting financial losses than profits. We also note that 
regulatory capital management via LLP is more prevalent for large conventional banks while 
the use of LLP to manage earnings is evident irrespective of bank size. Finally, where the E-
LLM model for Islamic banks mitigates lending pro-cyclicality, for conventional banks the I-
LLM model accentuates pro-cyclicality in lending. 
This paper contributes to the literature comparing Islamic and conventional banks in a 
number of ways. It is the first attempt to examine how distinctive financial reporting standards 
and loan loss models could lead to differentiated earnings and capital management behavior. 
We extend previous work on the implications of discretionary acts on financial reporting 
quality by Islamic and conventional banking (Safieddine, 2009; Elnahass et al., 2014; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Second, our findings highlight the influence of adopting a constrained 
banking business model, characterized by risk-sharing and additional governance mechanisms, 
on the opportunistic use of LLP (see Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012; McGuire et al., 2012; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Cieslewicz, 2014). In this regard, we further contribute to understanding 
the relevance of bank institutional characteristics on earnings management and financial 
reporting practices. Finally, by studying a subsample of Islamic banks that is ahead of 
conventional banks in applying the E-LLM, this study extends the findings of Bushman & 
Williams (2012) in documenting the opaqueness of this forward-looking model and its possible 
use in accounting discretion. 
Examining the use of LLP in capital and earnings management across the two banking 
sectors raises issues that are relevant to investors, auditors, and regulators who seek enhanced 
quality of reported financial information. Our empirical assessments of the application of the 
proposed model in Islamic banks could assist the IASB in resolving arguments around the 
subjectivity of E-LLM. Findings in this study inform future banking studies examining capital 
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and earnings management to explicitly reflect on both the alternative banking systems as well 
as the nature of the loan loss models applied. 
The next section presents a general background. Section 3 explains the rationale of our 
capital and earnings management hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the data. Section 5 discusses 
the methodology. Section 6 presents the descriptive and empirical results. Section 7 
summarizes and concludes. 
2.  Background 
2.1 Islamic Banking Business Model  
The core feature of Islamic banking is its profit-loss sharing paradigm8. That partnership 
arrangement implies that contractual structures are backed by real economic transactions 
linked to tangible assets. Although other financial products may resemble leasing contracts 
used in conventional banking, the latter do include elements of risk-sharing (Olson & Zoubi, 
2008; Beck et al., 2013). 
In trading by the profit-loss sharing principle, Islamic banks are generally viewed as more 
financially stable than conventional banks (see Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013). The 
risk-sharing model involves a limited use of hedging instruments (see Ali et al., 2011). In 
addition, Shariah-compliant funding restricts borrowing from international money markets. 
From those considerations, Islamic banks are expected to apply a credit-risk management 
strategy that features higher loan loss reserves, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower asset 
utilization relative to conventional banks. 
Despite being viewed as a constrained banking model, the profit-loss sharing model allows 
greater discretion in the administration of investment accounts and financial reporting (see 
                                                          
8 Because Islamic banks are prohibited from charging usury or interest, depositors are considered as investment account holders 
(IAHs) who engage with the bank through equity-based investment contracts (e.g., cost-plus mark-up and lease contracts). 
Based on these types of contracts, the losses are borne by the IAHs while the profits are shared between the bank and IAHs on 
a mutually agreed percentages (Belal et al., 2015).  
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Mills & Presley, 1999) where, in the absence of direct monitoring, tighter scrutiny of financial 
reporting is to be expected from IAHs. That enhanced monitoring implies that adverse 
selection and moral hazard are less likely (see Beck et al., 2013). Moreover, in being driven 
by religious business orientation, agency costs associated with trading in Islamic banks and 
opportunistic behavior by managers are expected to be lower. Indeed, there is evidence that 
banks with a strong ethical commitment demonstrate a higher quality of financial reporting 
and less involvement in earnings management (see Hilary & Hu, 2009; Choi & Pae, 2011; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2015). Furthermore, the “double-layer” of governance achieved by a 
Shariah supervisory board offers an additional monitoring mechanism (see Safieddine, 2009; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2016). In short, the stronger the firm institutional environment, the less 
prevalent are opportunistic and/or fraudulent practices (see Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et 
al., 2012).  
 
2.2 Regulatory Framework 
Islamic banks in most countries follow the IFRS treatment of loan losses. However, despite 
various attempts to unify global financial reporting practices between Islamic and conventional 
banks, many regulatory differences remain in the type of the loan loss model that is adopted by 
the two banking systems. 
In following IAS 39 and as currently adopted by conventional banks, the I-LLM has been 
subject to a number of revisions (see Ernst & Young, 2015a)9. With this model, LLP requires 
a loss impairment event to occur before the financial reporting date. In citing this practice as a 
main cause of the 2007 financial crisis, critics have successfully argued for a forward-looking 
loan loss model (see Fillat & Montoriol-Garriga, 2010; Wezel et al., 2012). With the E-LLM, 
                                                          
9 The definition of “incurred losses” requires evidence of the impairment of a financial asset or a group of financial assets 
where the impact upon future cash flows can be reliably estimated (see Ernst & Young, 2015a). Each loan is individually 
valued to determine whether a loss event has taken place, where the assessment is made at the end of each reporting period. 
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banks must assess their loan portfolios on the basis of a forecast of cash flows for the ensuing 
year (see Federation of European Accountants, 2010; Wezel et al., 2012)10. The idea is to build 
loan loss reserves during a period of economic growth in order to absorb losses in an economic 
downturn. However, the E-LLM is criticized for: (i) reliance on management judgement to 
estimate future cash flows (see Wezel et al., 2012; Ernst & Young, 2014); (ii) being less 
transparent, so permitting the concealment of a deteriorating loan portfolio (see Federation of 
European Accountants, 2010); and, (iii) the use of discretion in smoothing earnings, which may 
further detract from transparency and increase risk-taking (see Bushman & Williams, 2012).  
Islamic banks operating under the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)11 in Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar mandatorily apply the E-LLM 
(Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 2007; Taktak et al., 2010; AAOIFI, 2015). Where conventional banks in 
the same countries adopt the I-LLM under IFRS, this offers a unique regulatory setting for our 
study. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Earlier studies that test for capital (and earnings) management through LLP either fail to 
test for the effect of bank type or they do not distinguish between the structures of the loan 
loss models (see Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; Leventis et al., 2011). These aspects are important in identifying 
motives and underlying opportunities for differential capital (and earnings) management via 
                                                          
10 The adoption of E-LLM implies that banks will have to create large LLP that will vary in line with their changing assessments 
of credit and default risks. Additional forecasting becomes necessary for the whole portfolio of financial assets, measured at 
amortized cost. During the period of transition to the implementation of the E-LLM, profits will be reduced for the first 
implementation year (see Ernst & Young, 2014). The transition period will involve more complex auditing processes and 
verification procedures (e.g., accuracy, valuations, completeness, and occurrence assertions) for expected credit losses. The 
main distinction between the E-LLM and I-LLM lies with the timing rather than the level of loan losses. Where the I-LLM 
shows relatively higher net income in the period immediately following the acquisition of an asset, the E-LLM shows relatively 
lower net income in the early period of an asset’s life. 
11 The AAOIFI is a standard-setting body for Islamic financial institutions in the areas of accounting, auditing, ethics, and 
governance. AAOIFI is supported by nearly 200 members from 40 countries, including central banks. AAOIFI has issued a 
total of 88 standards comprising 26 accountability standards, 5 auditing standards, 7 governance standards, 2 ethics standards, 
and 48 Shariah standards (see AAOIFI, 2015). 
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LLP among the two banking sectors. 
3.1 Capital management hypothesis 
Motivations for capital management via LLP can be attributed to the incentive to improve 
or to maintain capital adequacy in order avoid official capital charges if a bank’s regulatory 
capital ratio falls below the minimum regulatory requirements. Prior studies in conventional 
banking, which examine how banks use LLP to manage regulatory capital, provide conflicting 
evidence. Moyer (1990) and Scholes et al. (1990) find that banks discretionarily use LLP when 
capital levels are close to violating minimum capital requirements. However, Collins et al. 
(1995) find no evidence of capital management behavior via LLP. Beatty et al. (1995) show 
that loan charge-offs and LLP are both used in capital management. With U.S. data, Kim & 
Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al. (1999) show that regulatory capital management is an important 
determinant of LLP. Lobo & Yang (2001) find that managers discretionarily manipulate LLP 
downward to meet regulatory capital requirements. In studies of banks in other industrialized 
countries, Anandarajan et al. (2007) find evidence that capital management through LLP exists 
in Australian banks. Pérez et al. (2008) find no such evidence for Spanish banks. For Islamic 
banking, the prior literature that specifically tests the capital management hypothesis is meagre. 
With both bank types facing capital adequacy penalties, there is a general incentive to 
engage with LLP, which suggests a positive association between LLP and the capital adequacy 
ratio (see Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2011). However, 
considering operations through a constrained business model, in the presence of an additional 
governance mechanism, and with an ethical business orientation, we predict that the use of LLP 
by Islamic banks to manage regulatory capital is less dominant and/or more difficult when 
compared to conventional banks. Hence, our first hypothesis is stated as: 
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𝐻01: There is a less significant positive association between the use of LLP and the capital 
adequacy ratio in Islamic banks relative to conventional banks.  
 
3.2 Earnings management hypothesis 
According to agency theory, bank managers can enhance firm performance and achieve 
managerial rewards through using LLP in income smoothing. Another strong motive for the 
use of LLP for earnings management is that less volatile earnings are fundamental predictors 
of stable share prices (Anandarajan et al., 2007). Consistent with Greenawalt & Sinkey (1988) 
and Beaver et al. (1989), banks managers can contribute additional LLP to loan loss reserves 
in expansionary periods and smooth out earnings in recessionary periods in order to reduce 
volatility to reported earnings. Similar behavior is found in global conventional banking studies 
(Wahlen, 1994; Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Fonseca 
and Gonza´lez, 2008; Pérez et al., 2008; Leventis et al., 2011).  
The Islamic banking literature presents mixed evidence. Ismail & Be Lay (2002) find that 
Malaysian Islamic banks use LLP to manage earnings, for the period 1997-1999. Within the 
GCC region, Zoubi & Al-khazali (2007) show that both bank types use LLP to smooth earnings, 
for the period 2000-2003.  Using cross-country evidence, Taktak et al. (2010) find no evidence 
that Islamic banks use LLP to manage earnings, for 2001-2006. For a sample of Middle East 
and North Africa banks, Abdelsalam et al. (2016) find no evidence of earnings management by 
Islamic banks, for the period 2008-2013. 
In general terms, if earnings management is an important determinant of LLP, a significant 
positive association is to be expected between LLP and earnings (before taxes and LLP). 
Nevertheless and in line with 𝐻01, we suggest that Islamic banks have fewer opportunities to 
smooth earnings via LLP even though they are subject to the less transparent E-LLM. Hence, 
our second hypothesis is stated as: 
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𝐻02: There is a less significant positive association between the use of LLP and earnings 
(before tax and LLP) in Islamic banks relative to conventional banks. 
 
4. Data  
We use an unbalanced panel dataset for listed and unlisted banks operating in Bahrain, 
Jordan, and Qatar, for the period 2007-2013. Consolidated financial data (in U.S. dollars) are 
collected from Thomson One Reuters, Bankscope, and Zawya databases. Although the 
concentration of Islamic banks is relatively high in our sample, conventional banks are larger 
by asset size. The sample countries features a homogenous cultural and macroeconomic 
environment (see Ernst & Young, 2015b). Banks located elsewhere are permitted to follow 
different reporting practices for LLP (i.e., either IFRS or AAOIFI). Hence, they fail to meet our 
test criterion for the mandatory application of E-LLM.  
The relevance of the sample period is that the Capital Adequacy Standard that covers Basel 
II requirements became effective for mandatory implementation by Islamic banks in 2007 (see 
IFSB, 2005; Ariss & Sarieddine, 2007). This period also allows an examination of whether 
bankers deviate from accounting standards and regulatory capital requirements during a period 
of financial distress (see Hoffmann & Pennings, 2013).  
Following Beck et al. (2013), our sample selection criteria require at least two bank-year 
observations for each bank within one country. Islamic windows are excluded from our sample 
on the grounds that supervisory issues and capital adequacy requirements for those windows 
are different (IFSB, 2005). Our final sample, therefore, consists of 441 bank-year observations 
(63 banks) including 238 bank-year observations of conventional banks (34 banks) and 203 
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bank-year observations of Islamic banks (29 banks) 12. Table 1 shows the distributions of banks; 
the highest concentration of Islamic banks is in Bahrain, while conventional banks have the 
highest presence in Jordan.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5. Methodology 
We test the capital (and earnings) management for Islamic and conventional bank using the 
regression specification outlined in Greenawalt & Sinkey (1988) and Ahmed et al. (1999). In 
our application, we examine the impact of bank characteristics and loan-loss regulatory 
frameworks on capital (𝐻01) and earnings (𝐻02) management. With the baseline model outlined 
by Eq. (1)13, we use fixed-effects estimations for the full sample and for the Islamic and 
conventional bank sub-samples:  
 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝐵1 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽10 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007 + 𝛽11𝑣𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    (1)            
Where  
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets.  
                                                          
12 For the treatment of the outliers, we winsorized each variable at the 5th and 95th. As a robustness check, we also considered 
1st-99th winsorization for all observations. Although the main findings are consistent, we observe slightly worse goodness-of-
fit statistics.  
 
13 The Hausman test reported the presence of systematic differences between the fixed and random effects (chi square = 26.78). 
Results are robust when employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for the full study sample. However, using 
fixed-effects allows more bank-year observations and control for heterogeneity across banks (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; 
Fonseca & Gonza´lez, 2008). Diagnostic tests performed for all estimated models finds no evidence of multicollinearity. We 
used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect multicollinearity among our independent variables. We also utilized the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to examine whether our model suffers from endogeneity problem. The White-general test is 
conducted to test for heteroscedasticity in error variances. VIF reports a mean of 1.65 which is well below the 10. This suggests 
that our model is not subject to a multicollinearity problem. Under the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the F-statistic reports a p-
value of (0.954), which indicates that our estimation procedures mitigate endogeneity. The White test shows a Chi-square p-
value of (0.891), which implies that heteroscedasticity is marginal at the 10% level. 
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TIER 1t−1 ratio is the ratio of the total bank Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets. This 
represents core capital. It is an equity-like direct measure of a bank’s capacity to establish LLP. 
Tier 1 capital is the sum of equity book value, qualifying non-cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock, and minority interests in equity accounts of subsidiaries, less goodwill and other 
intangible assets14. While the ratio reflects regulatory adjustments to equity, it is also a measure 
of financial health15. As suggested by Ahmed et al. (1999), we use a lagged value for the Tier 
1 ratio to indicate the availability of a capital cushion to increase LLP. Banks first signal their 
solvency through core capital in a prior reporting period before discretionarily increasing LLP 
in a subsequent period16 (Bushman & Williams, 2012).  
 EBTLLP (Earnings before taxes and LLP) is a measure of a bank’s capacity to use its assets 
to generate earnings in advance of its contractual obligations and LLP (Leventis et al., 2011). 
If income smoothing is an important determinant of LLP, we should observe a positive relation 
between LLP and EBTLLP (Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
ΔNPL is the change in non-performing loans and ∆LOANs is the change in total loans. We 
follow prior studies by including ∆NPL and ∆LOANs to control for the non-discretionary 
component of LLP (see Moyer, 1990; Ahmed et al., 1999; Jacques, 2010). More specifically, 
∆NPL is a proxy for default risk, whereas ∆LOANs controls for changes in a bank’s lending 
profile. We expect both variables to have positive coefficients. An increase in the quality of a 
                                                          
14 Under Basel II, Islamic and conventional banks must maintain a minimum ratio of 4% of Tier 1 capital and 8% of total 
capital (IFSB, 2005). 
 
15 We argue that the use of the total capital ratio could lead to spurious inferences from the net tax effect of increasing Tier 1 
and Tier 2 ratios. Before the amendment of the Basel Accord (1988), the regulatory capital ratio was expected to be negatively 
related to LLP; i.e., banks with low regulatory capital requirements had incentives to raise LLP (see Ahmed et al., 1999). These 
incentives were related to tax savings. Under Basel II, LLP must be included as a component of Tier 2 capital, eliminating loan 
loss reserves from Tier I capital. Moreover, examination of the associations between the total capital ratio and LLP is expected 
to be influenced by different national tax regimes across different bank types. In Bahrain, Islamic banks are tax exempt while 
in Qatar and Jordan, tax treatment depends on the legal form of the transactions. Islamic banks also have to pay a wealth tax 
(Zakat) (PwC, 2012). 
 
16 With a low level of LLP and a high level of Tier 1 capital reported in a preceding period, managers might have incentives 
to inflate current LLP in order to (i) avoid falling below the minimum capital adequacy requirement; (ii) reduce the volatility 
of bank capital adequacy; and (iii) reduce the possibility of having to draw from core capital if actual loan losses exceed 
expected losses. 
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loan portfolio and the outstanding total loan levels should increase the relative magnitude and 
timeliness of LLP (see Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988; Fonseca & Gonza´lez, 2008).  
LISTING is an indicator variable, taking a value of 1 for listed banks and 0 for unlisted 
banks. Controlling for listing aims to capture the positive association between a firm’s listing 
status and accounting manipulations (Beatty & Harris, 1999; Fonseca & Gonza´lez, 2008). 
Listed banks tend to report higher Tier 1 ratios and higher earnings to support their financial 
outlook in stock market trading (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2011).  
LEV is the leverage ratio (total debt to total common equity). This ratio captures the degree 
to which a bank’s potential capital saving is affected by understating risks (see Kiema & 
Jokivuolle, 2014). Leverage levels are expected to be positive, but relatively lower for Islamic 
banks given the absence of interest payments, non-trading in prohibited activities, and the 
inability to raise funds by indirect market operations.  
Both the GDP and CRISIS variables capture the effect of macroeconomic conditions on 
LLP. GDP is the annual growth rate of national income. By controlling for GDP, we identify 
the effect of pro-cyclicality in LLP. With rapid GDP growth, we expect borrowing to increase 
and that banks will need to increase LLPs to cater for additional risk. A negative coefficient on 
GDP implies that banks expand their loan portfolios in periods of rapid growth without making 
commensurate provision through LLP, so inducing pro-cyclical effects (see Fonseca & 
González, 2008; Leventis et al., 2011). 
 As an indicator variable for the crisis period, CRISIS takes the value 1 for years 2007-2009 
and 0 elsewhere. In a recession, we expect a negative association between LLP and CRISIS 
given the adverse implications of poor economic conditions on the level of LLP (see Cohen et 
al., 2014).  
IB is a bank type dummy variable (taking the value 1 for Islamic banks, and 0 for 
conventional banks).   
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To control for heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, all time series variables are normalized 
using total bank assets at the beginning of year t (TAi,t−1). Standard errors of estimated 
coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity (see Easton, 2003; Barth & Kallapur, 1996). 
Our panel estimation controls only for unobserved time effects (Tt) and unobserved 
heterogeneity across banks (vi) without imposing restrictive conditions on the correlation 
between the regressors and the error term17.  
To test  𝐻01 and  𝐻02 across the full sample, we extend our baseline model to include 
conditional interactions between bank type and capital (and earnings) management measures. 
This is specified in Eq. (2) as: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝐵1 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝐶𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵4 𝐶𝐵 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐼𝐵𝑖 +
𝛽12 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007 + 𝛽13𝑣𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                             (2)                  
                    
The interaction variables IB*TIER 1t−1 and CB*TIER 1t−1 examine the capital 
management hypothesis (𝐻01) by classifying banks as either Islamic (IB) or conventional (CB) 
whereas IB*EBTLLP and CB* EBTLLP test for differential earnings management. We predict 
the coefficients of Islamic banks (𝛽1 and 𝛽2) to be positive but lower in magnitude and 
significance than those for conventional banks (𝛽3 and 𝛽4).  
 
 
                                                          
17 In an attempt to provide cross-country evidence demonstrating the variations in the loan loss provisioning across banks, we 
do not control for country-specific effects. 
16 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses 
Table 2 panels A, B, and C report the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the 
Islamic and conventional subsamples. We also report the two-sample T-test to examine for 
the significance of the subsamples means. 
For the full sample, we report averages of 22.16% for TIER1t−1 and 16.92% for EBTLLP. 
With the TIER1t−1 exceeding the threshold of 4%, this indicates that our sample banks are 
well capitalized and can be classified as income-generating banks. The regulatory capital ratio 
for both bank types is right-skewed, which is consistent with the Basel II requirement for 
banks to keep a capital buffer above the minimum required. According to Berger et al. (2008), 
Basel II procedures deliver discretionary benefits to “well-capitalized” banks that hold Tier 1 
capital ratio of at least 4% of risk weighted assets. Although these primary results suggest that 
our banks are well-capitalized in period t − 1, they might remain motivated to continue 
preserving their adequate capital positions through the use of LLP in subsequent periods, 
where the aim is to prevent capital violation charges (Leventis et al., 2011).  
 The t-test statistics show that Islamic banks have significantly higher levels of LLP 
and TIER 1t−1. This suggest that they are more capitalized than conventional banks, which is 
consistent with the findings of Beck et al. (2013). The significantly lower EBTLLP for Islamic 
banks highlights their avoidance of more risky investments, their reliance upon fee-based 
contracts, and their relatively higher administrative costs (see Abedifar et al., 2013). Indicators 
for default risk (∆NPL) and loan growth (∆LOANS)—which are significantly lower for Islamic 
banks—accord with other studies (Beck et al., 2013). In addition, Islamic banks are 
significantly less leveraged and smaller in size than conventional banks.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Table 3 presents the Pearson Pair-Wise correlations for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic 
banks (Panel B), and conventional banks (Panel C). For the sub-samples, conventional banks 
show significant positive correlations between LLP and both TIER 1t−1 and EBTLLP, with no 
significant evidence for Islamic banks. For both Islamic and conventional banks, positive 
correlations between LLP and ∆NPL (and ∆LOANS) suggest that an increase in LLP is 
associated with high default risk and high credit growth. Correlations between LLP and other 
control variables are in line with prior literature. All correlations among independent variables 
are within accepted limits and raise no concerns with respect to multicollinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
6.2 Empirical results  
Table 4 reports the results for the baseline model in Eq. 1. In the full sample, a significant 
positive coefficient on Tier 1t−1 suggests that banks tend to have a high Tier 1 ratio in period 
t − 1 and that they are likely to increase their LLP in period t. We also find significant evidence 
of income smoothing, with a significant positive association between LLP and EBTLLP. These 
findings are in line with Kim & Kross (1998) and Anandarajan et al. (2007). For Islamic banks, 
both TIER 1 t−1 and EBTLLP are insignificantly associated with LLP, indicating the absence 
of capital (and earnings) management via LLP. For conventional banks, the discretionary use 
of LLP to manage regulatory capital and earnings is supported by positive and highly 
significant coefficients on TIER 1 t−1 and EBTLLP.  
For the full sample and each of the subsamples, the coefficient for ∆NPL is positive and 
significant; i.e., LLP is associated with a decline in the performance of the loan portfolio. The 
greater magnitude and significance of the coefficient on ∆NPL indicate that this effect is more 
pronounced for conventional banks. These results indicate lower default risk in Islamic banks 
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(Abedifar et al., 2013). Only conventional banks show a significant and positive association 
between ∆LOANS and LLP, suggesting a growth in their loan portfolios. The significant 
positive coefficient on LISTING shows that listed banks report higher levels of LLP, possibly 
to mitigate credit risk and to avoid any negative impact to their stock prices. Leverage (LEV) 
has no impact upon reported LLP.   
For conventional banks, we find a negative and significant association between CRISIS and 
LLP, suggesting a substantial reduction in the level of LLP during the crisis years. This suggests 
that during the financial crisis, conventional banks appear to reduce the levels of their LLP, 
subsequently amplifying pro-cyclicality and reflecting the greater instability of conventional 
banks (see Hasan & Dridi, 2011; Leventis et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013). The significant 
negative coefficient on GDP for conventional banks further indicates pro-cyclical lending. 
These macroeconomic effects are less apparent for Islamic banks, which might be attributed to 
their application of a counter-cyclical model: the E-LLM (see Bushman & Williams, 2012). 
For the bank type indicator variable (IB) in the full sample, we find a positive and significant 
relationship with LLP. This suggests a higher level of LLP for Islamic banks so giving support 
to the underlying prudence of the Islamic business model (Beck et al., 2013). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 5, we estimate Eq. 2, which extends the baseline model in Eq. 1, in two ways.  For 
the full sample, we run conditional interactions between bank type and the capital (and 
earnings) management measures, (CB, IB*TIER 1 t−1) and (CB, IB*EBTLLP). We also 
estimate the same model specification for a subsample which excludes large banks. With a 
greater propensity to engage in risk-taking activities, larger banks are more likely to adopt 
discretionary practices via LLP to minimize their capital violation penalties, to meet personal 
compensation/earnings targets, and/or to meet credit ratings/deposit insurance (see Leventis et 
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al., 2011; Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012). Following Berger et al. (2013), we exclude banks 
with assets exceeding $100 billion18. 
For the full sample, the insignificant coefficients on both the IB*TIER 1 t−1and IB*EBTLLP 
interaction variables confirm the absence of capital and earnings management in Islamic banks. 
For conventional banks, both CB*TIER 1 t−1 and CB*EBTLLP are significant and positively 
associated with LLP. Findings on the associations between LLP and control variables are 
unchanged. 
For the sub-sample that excludes large banks, we find that Islamic banks still show no 
significant change with respect to earnings and capital management. However, for conventional 
banks, the coefficient on CB*TIER 1 t−1 is no longer significant whereas that on CB*EBTLP 
is significant and positive. These results suggest that the discretionary use of LLP in capital 
management within conventional banks is more prevalent in large banks but that bank size has 
no influence on their earnings management behavior. These findings are consistent with prior 
evidence that large banks have greater incentives to maintain a strong regulatory capital 
adequacy position, given their close monitoring by investors and regulators (Beatty et al., 2002; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2015).  
 To examine whether there is a significant difference between capital (and earnings) 
management practices in both bank types, we compare the coefficients on Islamic and 
conventional banks interaction variables. The reported F-test indicates that the coefficients on 
(IB*Tier1 = CB*Tier1) and (IB*EBTLLP = CB*EBTLLP) are statistically different. This 
indicates a rejection of the null of no significant difference between capital and earnings 
management practices which supports the results reported for 𝐻01 and 𝐻02.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                          
18 Large banks represents about 9% of our sample. This tests is based on dropping 41 bank-year observations for both Islamic 
(27 observations) and conventional (14 observations) banks. 
20 
 
Overall, the absence of capital and earning management through LLP in Islamic banks can 
be explained on several grounds. First, the business model of Islamic banks promotes greater 
prudence and risk-averse attitude (see Beck et al., 2013). Second, with the inability to raise 
funds via direct market operations, Islamic banks operate on lower utilization levels of their 
assets, which is likely to promote higher capital buffers. Third is the effects of the ethical 
business orientation, monitoring by IAHs, and additional governance by the Shariah 
supervisory boards.  
From the above findings we argue that despite the motives and incentives to smooth earnings 
via LLP under the E-LLM framework, Islamic banks tend not to do so. This may reflect the 
impact of strong governance mechanisms and moral accountability in limiting accounting 
discretion (see Hilary & Hu, 2009; McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012; Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2015). 
6.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
We extend the base-line (Eq. 1) to allow for a dummy that captures banks’ failures to meet 
earnings targets (LOSSit). Based on the EBTLLP, the LOSSit is an indicator variable which 
takes the value 1 for loss-generating banks and 0 otherwise. We interact LOSSit with both 
TIER 1t−1 and each bank classification dummy (i.e., IB for Islamic banks and CB for 
conventional banks). Our extended model is specified as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝐵1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007 + 𝛽12𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (3) 
We expect that banks reporting negative earnings are more likely to increase LLP to avoid 
falling below the minimum capital adequacy requirement. For each bank type, and in line with 
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our hypotheses, lower significance and magnitude are predicted for the coefficient on 
LOSS*IB*TIER 1t−1 than that on LOSS*CB*TIER 1t−1. 
In Table 6, results for the full sample show that the coefficient on LOSS*IB*TIER 1t−1 is 
positive but insignificant. Islamic banks show consistent evidence of not managing regulatory 
capital through LLP even when they are reporting losses. For conventional banks, results show 
a highly significant and positive coefficient on LOSS*CB*TIER 1t−1 suggesting that loss-
generating conventional banks are more likely to engage in regulatory capital management via 
LLP. This finding is in line with Kanagaretnam et al. (2003), who show that poorly performing 
conventional banks are more likely to discretionarily use LLP to manage regulatory capital. 
The F-test for the two bank subsamples indicates statistically different capital management 
behavior via LLP. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study we empirically assess the impact of different banking business models on 
capital and earnings management practices. We explicitly examine the discretionary use of loan 
loss provisions for capital and earnings management. Our unique setting for testing capital and 
earnings management is where conventional and Islamic banks co-exist in the same countries 
but are subject to different regulatory frameworks to account for loan losses. 
We find evidence for the influence of bank type on capital and earnings management. 
Significant differences do exist in the capital and earnings management behavior between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. Islamic banks tend not to engage in either capital or 
income smoothing through LLP, even under the wide latitude of discretion permitted through 
the expected loan loss model. These results hold regardless of the bank size and profitability 
position. 
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 For conventional banks, we find significant evidence for the use of loan loss provisions to 
manage both regulatory capital and earnings. Capital management is more evident for large 
conventional banks. Discretionary acts via loan loss provisions are more pronounced for 
conventional banks with poor earnings performance. We provide evidence that, unlike the 
expected loan loss model, the incurred loan loss model accentuates pro-cyclicality in lending.  
Findings in this study suggest that the opportunistic use of loan loss provisions is sensitive 
to the constraints imposed by the business model and the system of governance employed in 
banks. The expected loan loss model is soon to be universally adopted via IFRS 9. This will 
present an opportunity to examine the impact upon the earnings management practices of 
conventional banks. 
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Table 1- Sample Distributions by Country and Bank Type 
Country Islamic  
Banks 
Conventional 
 Banks 
Full 
Sample 
Composition 
Islamic Banks 
Composition 
Conventional 
Banks 
Bahrain 154 91 245 67% 38% 
Jordan 21 105 126 9% 44% 
Qatar 28 42 70 12% 18% 
Observations 230 238 441 52% 54% 
Banks 29 34 63 - - 
Notes: The table shows the number of the Islamic banks and the conventional banks 
available in Bankscope, Thomson One Reuters, and Zawya for each of the three countries 
during the sample coverage period of 2007 to 2013. Composition (%) is the number of banks 
included in the sample as a percentage of the total number of banks year observations. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE Two-Sample t-Test (two-
tailed) 
VARIABLES Mean Median Std. Min Max  
LLP 0.054 0.038 0.060 -0.031 0.569 6.358*** 
TIER 1t−1 22.169 19.400 11.398 6.490 20.700 7.434*** 
EBTLLP 16.924 17.481 19.227 -24.427 64.112 -8.683*** 
∆NPL 0.063 0.052 0.045 -0.322 0.945 -3.264** 
∆LOANS 0.157 0.204 0.504 -0.569 0.935 -2.118* 
LISTING 0.540 1 0.499 0 1 -6.521*** 
LEV 5.151 5.231 4.673   0.536 9.729 -5.894*** 
GDP 11.389 12.097 10.423 -10.784 30.929 - 
TAt−1 6,178.342 5,191.531 7,952,.810 133.600 32,306.710 -5.440*** 
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  PANEL B: ISLAMIC BANKS SUBSAMPLE 
LLP 0.063 0.057 0.087 -0.031 0.269 
TIER 1t−1 18.367 16.620 19.945 9.071 20.700 
EBTLLP 14.186 13.162 16.939 -23.000 60.562 
∆NPL 0.060 0.063 0.053 -0.045 0.945 
∆LOANS 0.351 0.361 0.209 -0.569 0.716 
LISTING 0.379 0 0.486 0 1 
LEV 3.766 3.031 2.942 0.536 9.729 
GDP 10.569 11.097 10.598 -10.784 30.929 
TAt−1 3,206.268 1,408.900 4,569.434 133.600 21,251.100 
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PANEL C: CONVENTIONAL BANKS SUBSAMPLE 
LLP 0.049 0.032 0.059 -0.004 0.569 
TIER 1t−1 17.498 16.665 17.051 6.490 19.780 
EBTLLP 18.405 19.697 15.149 -24.427 64.112 
∆NPL 0.082 0.046 0.048 -0.332 0.899 
∆LOANS 0.367 0.438 0.597 -0.431 0.935 
LISTING 0.676 1 0.469 0 1 
LEV 6.308 6.282 5.743 3.625 9.726 
GDP 12.090 11.937 11.024 -10.784 30.929 
TAt−1 8,513.542 6,947.084 10,704.100 254.000 32,306.710 
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables considered in our analyses. The sample period 
is 2007 to 2013. Panel A: results for the full sample including CBs and IBs with 441bank-year observations. Panel 
B: results for IBs sub-sample comprising 203 bank-year observations. Panel C: results for the sub-sample of CBs 
representing 238 bank-year observations. We report on the paired sample mean test (T-test) for Islamic and 
conventional banks sub-samples. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 3 - Pearson Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix for the Years 2007-2013 
PANEL A: Full Sample 
Variables LLP  𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟏,𝐭−𝟏 EBTLLP ∆𝐍𝐏𝐋 ∆𝐋𝐎𝐀𝐍𝐒 LEV GDP 
LLP 1       
TIER 1t−1 0.025*** 1      
EBTLLP 0.385*** -0.077 1     
∆NPL 0.013 0.019 0.023** 1    
∆LOANS 0.057** -0.180* 0.157 0.291** 1   
LEV 0.017 -0.511*** -0.292 0.071 0.135 1  
GDP -0.031*** -0.102 0.244** -0.175 0.079 0.033 1 
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PANEL B:  Islamic Banks Subsample 
Variables LLP  Tier 1,t−1 EBTLLP ∆NPL ∆LOANS LEV GDP 
LLP 1       
TIER 1t−1 0.033 1      
EBTLLP 0.296 -0.053 1     
∆NPL 0.285*** 0.027** 0.071** 1    
∆LOANS 0.110** -0.135 0.151 0.615 1   
LEV 0.147 -0.378 0.195 0.323** 0.100 1  
GDP -0.025 -0.352 0.147 0.122 0.055 0.048 1 
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PANEL C:  Conventional Banks Subsample 
Variables LLP  Tier 1,t−1 EBTLLP ∆NPL ∆LOANS LEV GDP 
LLP 1       
TIER 1t−1 0.047*** 1      
EBTLLP 0.248*** -0.072 1     
∆NPL 0.049** 0.013 0.044** 1    
∆LOANS 0.020** -0.380 0.280 0.055** 1   
LEV 0.029 -0.522*** 0.135** 0.048 0.124 1  
GDP -0.053*** -0.102 0.138** -0.152 0.045 0.070 1 
Notes: The table reports for the full sample pairwise correlation coefficients for bank specific (LLP, ∆NPL, ∆LOANs, LEV), macroeconomic 
(GDP), capital management (TIER 1t−1) and income smoothing (EBT) variables included in our estimation. Panel A: presents the results 
for the full sample including conventional and Islamic with 441 bank-year observations. Panel B: results for Islamic sub-sample 
comprising 203 bank-year observations. Panel C: results for the sub- of conventional banks representing 238 bank-year observations. 
** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 4 - Regression Analysis of Capital and Earnings Management: Full sample and Bank 
Types Subsamples 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Full 
Sample 
Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 + 0.023*** 0.010 0.014*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.112) (0.000) 
EBTLLP + 0.027*** 0.015 0.022** 
  (0.000) (0.101) (0.018) 
∆𝐍𝐏𝐋 + 0.041**   0.024** 0.029*** 
 
 
(0.035) (0.048) (0.000) 
∆𝐋𝐎𝐀𝐍𝐒 + 0.018** -0.031 0.017** 
 
 
(0.022) (0.881) (0.046) 
LISTING + 0.031** 0.021** 0.025*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) 
LEV + 0.017 0.018 0.039 
  (0.663) (0.081) (0.383) 
CRISIS - -0.021** 0.024 -0.045** 
  (0.036) (0.396) (0.041) 
GDP - -0.049** -0.035 -0.030** 
  (0.021) (0.098) (0.038) 
IB ? 0.011**   
  (0.007)   
 Hausman Test 26.78    
 (0.000)    
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Year Fixed effects  YES YES YES 
Bank specific 
effects 
 YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  
 
0.381 0.351 0.378 
Bank-Year 
Observations 
 
441 203 238 
Notes: The table reports Fixed-Effects estimations for testing the capital and earnings 
management hypotheses for the full sample as well as within the Islamic and conventional 
banks sub-samples. Our base line estimation model is specified as: 
 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +   𝐵1 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  + 𝛽9𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛽10 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007
+ 𝛽11𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.  P-values are between parentheses. 
** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 - Regression Analysis of Capital and Earnings Management with Conditional Interactions:  
Full Sample and when Excluding Large Banks 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Full 
sample 
Excluding Large Banks 
IB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 + 0.011 0.016 
  
(0.078) (0.611) 
IB*EBTLLP + 0.026 0.019 
  (0.061) (0.784) 
CB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 + 0.019*** 0.014 
  (0.000) (0.098) 
CB*EBTLLP + 0.034*** 0.026*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
∆𝐍𝐏𝐋 + 0.021** 0.020** 
  (0.013) (0.006) 
∆𝐋𝐎𝐀𝐍𝐒 + 0.040*** -0.035 
  (0.000) (0.352) 
LISTING + 0.022*** 0.012*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV + -0.025 -0.040 
  (0.426) (0.261) 
CRISIS - -0.053** -0.050** 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
GDP - -0.023** -0.030** 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
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IB ? 0.024** 0.023** 
  (0.004) (0.008) 
IB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏=  CB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏,  (F-
Test) 
 33.75 43.21 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
IB*EBTLLP =  CB*EBTLLP, (F-Test)  8.94 20.64 
  (0.004) (0.000) 
Year Fixed effects 
 
YES YES 
Bank specific effects  YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  
 
0.492 0.463 
Bank-Year Observations 
 
441 400 
Notes: The table reports Fixed-Effects estimations for testing the capital and earnings management 
hypotheses for the full sample and after dropping large banks (holding of total assets exceeding 
$100 billion). Our specified model is defined as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝐵1 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝐵4 𝐶𝐵 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛽12 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007
+ 𝛽13𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.  P-values are between 
parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 -  Regression Analysis of Capital and Earnings Management 
Identifying the Effects for Loss-Generating Banks 
Variables Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample 
LOSS*IB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 ? 0.015 
  (0.625) 
LOSS*CB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 ? 0.015*** 
  (0.003) 
LOSS - -0.023** 
  (0.003) 
∆𝐍𝐏𝐋 + 0.012** 
  
(0.048) 
∆𝐋𝐎𝐀𝐍𝐒 + 0.023** 
  (0.041) 
LISTING + 0.025*** 
  (0.000) 
LEV + -0.031 
  
(0.083) 
CRISIS - -0.017** 
  (0.027) 
GDP - -0.029*** 
  (0.003) 
IB ? 0.018** 
  (0.000) 
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LOSS*IB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏 =   
LOSS*CB*𝐓𝐈𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝐭−𝟏, (F-Test) 
  
45.96 
  (0.000) 
Year Fixed effects  YES 
Bank specific effects  YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 
 
0.320 
Bank-Year Observations 
 
441 
Notes: The table reports Fixed-Effects estimations for testing the capital 
management hypothesis for the full sample to test for the loss-generating 
banks. LOSS is a dummy indicator equal 1 for loss-generating banks and 0 
for profit-generating banks. Our specified model is defined as: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝐵1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐼𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐵 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐼𝐵𝑖
+  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2013
𝑡=2007
+ 𝛽12𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 Standard errors of estimated coefficients are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. P-values are between parentheses. ** and *** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix  
Variable Definitions and Descriptions  
Variable  Notation Description 
Loan Loss Provisions 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Loan loss provisions at year t. The variable is 
normalized by total assets at the beginning of year t 
(𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1).  
One-period Lagged 
Tier 1 Ratio 
𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 1𝑡−1 Ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets for the 
year t − 1. 
Earnings Before 
Taxes and LLP 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions at 
year t. The variable is normalized by total assets at 
the beginning of year t (𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1). 
Change in Non-
performing Loans 
∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 
 
Change in non-performing loans estimated as the 
difference between year t and year t − 1. The 
variable is normalized by total assets at the 
beginning of year t (TAi,t−1). 
Change in total loans ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 Change in total loans at year t estimated as the 
difference of the bank’s total loans between year t 
and t − 1. The variable is normalized by total assets 
at the beginning of year t (TAi,t−1). 
Listing Status  𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 Dummy variable for the listing status of bank i at 
time t, equal 1 if the bank is listed; 0 otherwise. 
Leverage Ratio 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 Leverage ratio equal to total debt to total common 
equity for bank i at time t. 
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Financial Crisis 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 Time dummy equal 1 for the sample period of 2007-
2009 and 0 otherwise. 
GDP Growth Rate 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 The country-prevailing GDP growth rate at time t. 
Bank Type Dummy 𝐼𝐵𝑖 Dummy variable equal 1 for IBs; 0 for CBs. 
One-period Lagged 
Total Assets 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 Total assets for bank i at time t-1  
LOSS 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 Dummy variable testing for loss-generating banks 
equals 1 if banks i at time t is generating losses and 
0 for a profit-generating bank at time t. 
Notes: definitions and notations for test variables in the empirical models examined in 
this study. 
